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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
special Mississippi statute of incorporation exempted from taxation a college
campus and buildings "and the endowment fund contributed to said college."
Held, state court properly construed statute in ruling that real estate not part
of the campus of the college, but donated to and rented by it for income pur-
poses, is not included in the exemption. Millsaps College v. Jackson, 48 Sup.
Ct. 94 (1927).
Great weight attaches to decisions of a state court regarding questions of
taxation or exemption therefrom under the constitution or laws of its own state,
and the United States Supreme Court will follow the construction of a state
court on a contract of exemption from taxation when that construction is not
obviously erroneous. Chicago Theological Seminary v. Ill. ex rel. Raymond, 188
U. S. 662; Jetton v. University of South, 208 U. S. 489.
Ordinarily an alleged statutory grant of exemption from taxation will be
strictly construed. People v. Watseka Camp Meeting Assoc., 160 I1. 576, 43
N. E. 716; Rochester v. Rochester R. Co., 182 N. Y. 99, 74 N. E. 953. Where
there is doubt as to the legislative intention, or as to the inclusion of particular
property within the terms of the statute, the presumption is in favor of the
taxing power, and the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to
exemption. Trenton v. Humel, 134 Mo. App. 595, 114 S. W. 1131; People v.
N. Y. Tax Com'rs., 95 N. Y. 554.
An educational institution cannot as a general rule claim exemption from tax-
ation in respect to property which it rents out for purposes wholly unconnected
with its educational work. Pratt Institute v. City of New York, 91 N. Y. S.
136; Willamette University v. Knight, 35 Ore. 33, 56 P. 124; Commonwealth v.
Hampton Institute, 106 Va. 614, 56 S. E. 594. But in some cases, where the
exemption laws or charter provisions are broad enough to include such property
yielding a revenue which is applied directly and exclusively to the maintenance
of the institution, the exemption will be upheld. New Haven v. Sheffield Scien-
tifi School, 59 Conn. 163, 22 At. 156; Williston Seminary v. County Commis-
sioners, 147 Mass. 427, 18 N. E. 210; Little v. Theological Seminary, 72 Ohio St.
417, 74 N. E. 193.
In the case under discussion the statute specifically designated certain land
which was to be subject to the exemption. The Mississippi Court (136 Miss.
795, 101 So. 574), applying the rule of strict construction, stated that "the spe-
cific grant of an exemption on land of a certain character negatives by implica-
tion an intention to exempt land of a different character," citing State v. Kroll-
man, 38 N. J. L. 574. This seems to be a reasonable inference which the United
State Supreme Court properly upheld. F. A. E., '28.
PLEA ING-ExHIIT Nor PART oF PLEADING.-The trial court in a Missouri
suit against an Indiana corporation sustained plaintiff's motion to strike out a
paragraph of defendant's answer, which had attacked the jurisdiction of the
court. The paragraph stated that the General Assembly of the State of Indiana
had enacted a statute known as the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, which
at all times in question was and remained in force in the State of Indiana, "a
copy of which said act is herewith filed and marked defendant's Exhibit A, and
that the act and each and every section thereof is hereby made a part of this
plea, the same as if specifically pleaded herein." Held, that an exhibit attached
to a petition or answer is not so far a part of the pleading itself as to save it
from being bad on demurrer or motion to strike out, even though, if the petition
were aided by the contents of the exhibit, it would thus be rendered good.
Scott v. Vincennes Bridge Co., 299 S. W. 145 (Mo. 1927).
The rules in the various jurisdictions as to the effect of an exhibit annexed
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to and filed with the pleading are not uniform. An exhibit is no part of a
pleading in an action at common law. Gulf C. & S. F. Co. v. Cities Service Co.,
270 Fed. 994. Missouri has almost an iron-bound rule in keeping with the com-
mon law. Exhibits mentioned and other records referred to are not part of
the pleading and resort cannot be had thereto in order to aid the latter. John-
son v. Crowley, 207 S. W. 235. State ex tel. Siegel v. Grimm, 314 Mo. 242, 284
S. W. 490. Insurance policies fall under the same rule. See Mattero v. Cent.
Life Ins. Co., 202 Mo. A. 293, 215 S. W. 750. Other states which hold that an
exhibit attached to a pleading does not become a part of the pleading are Illinois,
Ohio, South Carolina, Mississippi, Colorado, and Wyoming. However, a ma-
jority of the states hold the other way, the ratio being about two to one. Under
the various provisions governing pleading in these jurisdictions, where an ex-
hibit is annexed to a pleading with proper references in the pleading, the effect
is as if the instrument sued on were set out in the pleading. These exhibits
include contracts, Phinney v. Andrus, 109 Wisc. 397, 178 N. Y. S. 760; Shelton
v. Eisemann, 79 So. 75 (Fla.), Ord v. Burreston, 52 Utah 201, 173 Pac. 132;
deeds, East San Mateo Land Co. v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 30 Cal. A. 223, 157 Pac.
634; and letters, Hubb-Diggs Co. v. Mitchell, 256 S. W. 702 (Tex.). It is
agreed in all the states that an exhibit will not supply the substantial allegations
essential to the statement of a cause of action or defense. One of the very
few cases contra is Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Olson, 82 Minn. 187, differentiated
on the ground that the pleading was framed for that purpose and with that end
in view. J. J. C., '30.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-NON-MARKETABILITY OF TITLE AS GROUND FOR RE-
sclssioN.-The purchaser of a tract of land sought to rescind the contract of
sale and recover payments made thereunder because of alleged defects in title
objected to by his attorney, which defendant made no attempts to cure. There
was a judgment for plaintiff which was affirmed on appeal. Larson v. Thomas,
215 N. W. 927 (S. D., 1927).
There is an implied covenant on the part of the vendor to convey a good
marketable title to the land, Green v. Ditsch, 143 Mo. 1, 44 S. W. 799.
The question in the case related to the conditions under which a purchaser
could refuse to accept a conveyance on the ground that the title was not market-
able although it was in fact good. One test as to when a title is marketable is
firmly established both in England and the United States. Whenever there is
a reasonable probability of future controversy the contract will not be enforced.
Fleming v. Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. 905; Jefferies v. Jefferies, 117 Mass.
184. A vendee will not be compelled to buy a law suit. Smith v. Hunter, 241
Ill. 514, 89 N. E. 686; Brokaw v. Duffy, 165 N. Y. 391, 59 N. E. 196; Ives v.
Kimblin, 140 Mo. A. 293, 124 S. W. 23; Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. A. 330. The bare
possibility that the title may prove defective gives the purchaser no right to re-
fuse to accept the title. Atteberry v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363.
The conflict in the cases arises in determining who is to decide whether or
not there is a reasonable probability of a future controversy over the title. In
the principal case the respondent laid stress on the opinion of counsel as a
determining factor in ascertaining the marketability of a title, and the court
decided that a purchaser might reject a title on an opinion of counsel given in
good faith if any of the questions involved were doubtful questions of law which
would be objected to by most, if not all, reputable and competent attorneys.
The case of Eggers v. Busch, 154 Ill. 604, 39 N. E. 619, is very similar to the
principal case in its facts. The court there said, "A material defect in the title
to land is such a defect as will cause a reasonable doubt and just apprehension
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